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A NEW PRAGMATISM IN ROBINSON-PATMAN
INTERPRETATIONS?
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER

For a long time the courts have sanctioned the Federal Trade Com
mission's interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act rather uncritically.
The Trade Commission has in turn worked diligently at pressing interpreta
tions which would facilitate proof of violation and restrict the scope of
necessary inquiry to as narrow a base as possible. The asymmetrical gram
matical construction of the Act has allowed the isolation and strict inter
pretation of the various sub-sections.Above all, the Commission has insisted
on literal reading of the statutory language when the result favored finding
a violation; economic differences were less distinguishing than semantical
ones.1
Success has its price, however, and the Commission found itself, on at
least one occasion, thwarted in an interpretation primarily because of prior
compartmentalization. In the Grand Union case, 2the Commission (appar
ently believing that the provision prohibiting the receipt of discriminatory
allowances could apply only to the receipt of cash payments and not on
promotional allowances 3) invoked its jurisdiction under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act 4 and declared the receipt an unfair method
of competition. At that point, it seemed that the Commission was asserting
its right to rely, at its option, on either the intricate and sometimes irrational
construction applied by literal reading of the statute or something in
the nature of a joker which it could use when strict interpretation was
unavailing. ,\Vhen the Second Circuit, by a split decision, approved the
Trade Commission's position,5 one could fear that the traditional distribu
tion channels which had long been protected by the Commission through
its interpretation of Robinson-Patman had gained a new permanency and
that distributive experimentation, however sound economically, was vul
nerable.This paper will be a brief attempt at an evaluation of the period
since Gran d Union to see to what extent such pessimism has been justified.
Since Grand Union, the Trade Commission has invoked section 5 in a
number of cases and has won two additional court tests of its ability to use
its broad power to interdict conduct violative of the "spirit "but not the
1. The author's complaints, along this line, are to be found in Alexander, Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, A Deus Ex Machina in the Tragic Interpretation
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 317 (1961),
2. Grand Union Co., No. 6973, FTC, Aug. 12, 1960.
3, The gist of my article, supra note 1, is that 2(f) properly interpreted, applies
equally to both.
4. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
5. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
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letter of the Robinson-Patman Act.6 It should be noted, however, that in
each of these court tests the issue was precisely the same as in Grand Union:
a buyer was participating in conduct which for the seller violated the
promotional allowance section. No court has yet passed on the Trade
Commission's broader assertion that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com
mission Act is applicable in any case in which acts are deemed by the
Trade Commission to violate the "spirit"of Robinson-Patman.
It may well be that the receipt of a promotional discrimination is
expressly covered by a more careful interpretation of section 2(£), a point
reserved by the Second Circuit in Grand Union.7 Indeed, the court suggested
the possibility of the applicability of section 2(£) by expressly refuting the
assertion that were it applicable, section 5 should not have been invoked.
Despite the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws 8 recommending that the broad Trade Commission power
not be applied to violation of the Clayton Act, Judge Clark stated that he
saw no objection to such practice.9
In any event, Grand Union could hardly be classed as a case broadly
supporting the Trade Commission's assertion of the scope of Section 5 of
the Trade Commission Act. Judge Clark, after carefully noting the ex
pressed concern over the revolutionary possibilities in this new use of
section 5, stated his sympathy with the general objection, but found it
"misplaced in the instant case."lO
Obviously, Grand Union raised more questions than it answered. One
of the most disturbing is the question whether by invoking section 5 power
the Trade Commission can in other cases avoid resolving paradoxes con
tained in the Act through reliance on what it conceives to be the spirit of
the Act. A recent case suggests perhaps not.
In R. H. Macy b Co.

v.

FTCl l the Second Circuit had before it a

slightly different application of the Grand Union problem.In the conduct
of its one-hundredth anniversary celebration, Macy had solicited approxi
mately 750 of its 20,000 vendors for contributions of $1,000 each to defray
promotional advertising costs. A substantial number agreed, apparently
without offering similar contributions on proportionally equal terms to
Macy's competitors. By so doing they had apparently violated the Robinson
Patman Act. But which section? Despite the similarity between the con
cession received in this case and concession received in Grand Union, a dis
tinguishing feature of the Macy contribution was that the money was to be
6. American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824
(1962). Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910
(1963).
7. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, supra note 5, at 95.
8. March 31, 1955, 148-159 n.78.
9. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, supra note 5, at 95.
10. Id. at 96.
11. 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
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used entirely for Macy's benefit. Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act
applied on its face only to "payment ... for any services or facilities fur
nished... in connection with the processing, handling, sale or offering
for sale of any products or commodities manufactured. or offered for sale by
such person. ..:' 12Since there was no connection between the allowance
granted and advertising for the supplier, Macy contended that 2(d) did
not apply. If 2(d) did not apply, the argument continued, Grand Union
was also not on point. Without resolving the applicability of 2(d), the
Trade Commission found the payment violative of the spirit of Robinson
Patman and consequently of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The Second Circuit affirmed.13 What is interesting about the affirmance,
however, is that the Court of Appeals chose to affirm not on the basis of a
violation of the spirit of the Robinson-Patman Act 14 but on the basis of
a 2(d) violation.Reasoning that a distinction between allowances given for
the benefit of the seller and those coerced solely for the benefit of the buyer
should not be invoked on the buyer's behalf in light of legislative history
identifying large buyers as the target of the Act, the court found no difficulty
in bringing the grant of the allowance under 2(d). Having done that, the
case was parallel with Grand Union; the remaining problems were dis
posed of with comparative ease.
It is difficult to read into a case affirming a Trade Commission order
a principle limiting the Commission. Nonetheless, it seems that the court
went to unnecessary length to make two points. First, by refusing to
settle the matter as a violation of the spirit of Robinson-Patman, the court
re-emphasized the limited nature of its Grand Union holding. Indeed, the
very reason that the court invoked to find section 2(d) applicable can be
used even more persuasively to demonstrate that the payment in question
violates the spirit of the Robinson-Patman Act. Secondly, the court demon
strated how obscurities in the Act can be reconciled along more regular
lines of statutory interpretation to arrive at palatable results. The latter
may well be regarded as an admonition to the Trade Commission to make
some attempt along the same line. It is difficult to assert that Macy's de
fense ought be determinative of the issue of discriminatory allowance pay
ments, except on the grounds favoring literal interpretation of the Act. is
Bringing the Robinson-Patman Act to bear by interpretation suggests a
viability in the Act that it has infrequently appeared to have previously.
The Federal Trade Commission has also' recently been rebuffed in an
12. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936). 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958).
13 . R. H. Macy &: Co. v. FTC. supra note II.
14. Indeed the court stated more broadly. "Nor do we find it necessary to determine
whether Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the Commission to
prohibit any trade practice which i t deems to contravene the spirit of the Robinson
Patman Act . . . ." Id. at 447.
15. But see Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 386. 387
(1962) .
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attempt to do what Macy attempted in the aforementioned case: to base a
distinction in result on a strict construction of the language of the Act. In
Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC16 the Commission contended that it
did not have to consider the company's argument that it had offered allow
ances for advertising and premium plans in a discriminatory fashion in
order to meet competition.The meeting of competition defense, concededly
applicable to furnishing services, was held not applicable to paying for
them. The Commission's position was based in part on its interpretation of
legislative history; the history involved is sufficiently ambiguous, however,
to reduce its position almost to this: The meeting of competition proviso
(discussed more fully below) 17 expressly allows justification only for "lower
price or the furnishing of services or facilities . . . . "18 The main distinction
between subsections (d) and (e), both of which relate to arrangements for
"services and facilities," is that under (d) they are provided by the buyer
and paid by the seller while under (e) the seller provides them directly
"furnishes "in statutory language.19 One is expressly mentioned,. the other
is not in the 2(b) formula. Consequently 2(b) applies to 2(e) but not to 2(d).
The court considered the Commission's opinion at some length, in part
because it stated that it attached great weight to the view of the Commis
sion, reviewed the legislative history proposed by both parties and came
to the conclusion, on balance, that nothing in the legislative history sup
ported such a narrow reading of the Act. It then concluded, "We think
this is an unrealistic reading of the statute."20 Analyzing the evil pro
hibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, the court said in language which
might have been equally applicable in the Macy controversy, "Congress
was here dealing with a fundamental economic concept; it was not shadow
boxing or indulging in fine semantic shadings."21
One further illustration on the peripheral problems of Robinson
Patman enforcement will perhaps suffice to make the point. In Nuarc Co.
v. FTC22 the Trade Commission had found certain advertising payments
to be a violation of section 2(d).A publisher who was also the controlling
shareholder in a company manufacturing and distributing printing and
lithograph equipment had solicited suppliers of the manufacturing com
pany for advertising in his publication. Their placing of ads was held
illegal by the FTC. Finding the evidence of a connection between the pub
lishing business and the manufacturing business to be insubstantial, the Sev
enth Circuit set aside the Trade Commission order.The mere profit made
16. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 888 (1962).
17. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
18. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
19. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d), (e) (1958).
20. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 16, at 502.
21. Ibid.
22. 316 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1963).
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by the controlling shareholder of the manufacturer in his role as controlling
shareholder of the publisher was not the kind of discriminatory benefit
that the Act was designed to prevent,held the court.
It should be noted that great care was taken by companies in this case
to keep the two enterprises separate. 23 Indeed, the manufacturer was re
quired to pay standard rates for advertising in the publisher's publication,
although one may wonder whether this fact is significant with respect to
the benefited controlling shareholder. The supplier's payments were made at
standard advertising rates-the same rates paid by competitors of the sup
plier who were apparently also customers of the publisher.Lack of connec
tion between the publisher and printer made it possible for the court to dis
tinguish this case from the principle case suggesting the opposite result, 24 in
which payments for advertising space in A & P's publication had been held a
violation of 2(d). In both cases money was paid solely for advertising services
rendered. A lack of proportionally equal payments had been found sufficient
to interdict the A & P arrangement. As a result the Trade Commission rea
soned that payment to a customer, even through an intermediary, was itself
prohibited. Reading the legislative history to require something more, the
court disagreed."'\Ve believe that Section 2(d) requires a showing that some
benefit accrued to, or was intended to accrue to, the customer.. . . The
only benefit that could have possibly accrued to . .. [the manufacturer]
was through the indirect route of profits from the printing business accru
ing to

•

•

•

the owner of both enterprises. This, without more, cannot be

the basis of a Section 2(d) violation. A contrary decision would operate as
a compulsory divestiture for any owner of an advertising medium that also
engaged in a separate enterprise selling products advertised in his publica
tion. The evidence contradicts any inference that other indirect benefits
were intended. .. . "25
In annunciating the benefit requirement for 2(d) violations the court
was not unmindful of P. Lorillard Co.

v.

FTC 26 which it quoted at some

length. That case, of course, stood for the converse proposition that where
the interdicted benefit accrued, the fact that it resulted from what appeared
to be two separate transactions and did not How directly from the supplier
to the customer was not determinative. Nuarc also suggests that literal read
ing of the statute, which provides disjunctively against payments to a cus
tomer and payments for a customer's benefit, will not necessarily lead to
23. Both the reviewing court and the Federal Trade Commission agreed that in its
inception the arrangement was a violation of 2(d). In initial letters, solicitations for
advertising indicated a direct link between the promotion of the manufacturing business
and the intended publication. No ads were placed during this period, however, and the
court and Trade Commission disagreed as to whether the original infirmity in this
scheme pervaded its later realization.
24. State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959).
25. Nuarc Co. v. FTC, supra note 22, at 582.
26. 267 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1959).
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appropriate results. The realities of a discriminatory benefit may be a more
reliable criterion for distinction.
Anticompetitive Effect. Having examined a few peripheral problems of
price discrimination, it is interesting to compare some recent developments
in sections which go more to the heart of Robinson-Patman discriminations.
Two recent cases have given interesting insights into the meaning of the
anticompetitive effect required in the basic price discrimination provision
itself_27
Even unjustified discriminations do not violate the Robinson-Patman
•

Act unless their effect is anticompetitive if they take the form of 2(a) price
reductions_ It is thus possible for a seller to have different prices for different
customers of the same product in some circumstances. For example, a seller
appears to have the right to make a territorial reduction as a legitimate
competitive response to local conditions (even though it may not meet the
2(b) defense) where the discrimination does not affect competition among
his customers but rather runs against one of his own competitors ("primary
line competition"). Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. F TC28 suggested broadly that,
under such circumstances, an absence of a broadly defined anticompetitive
effect barred interdiction of localized price reductions.29 However liberating
that opinion may have been on the ability of the seller to compete with
other sellers of similar products, it did not go very far in suggesting how a
seller might pragmatically determine in advance of his price reduction
whether the Robinson-Patman Act would allow it or not_ In light of the
fact that the court in Anheuser-Busch found no quarrel with the decision
of the previous cases which had interdicted what it characterized as "pred
atory misconduct" in cases in which the localized price reduction was too
effective, the line to be drawn appeared still to be nebulous.
Shore Gas & Oil Co.

v.

Humble Oil & Refining Co.so provided a con

siderably less involved approach.In a highly competitive local market the
defendant oil distributor was able to obtain a substantial customer (a cab
company consuming about 50,000 gallons of gasoline a year) which had
previously dealt with the plaintiff, on the basis of a price concession which
brought its price below that otherwise charged.Plaintiff, having lost a custo
mer, brought suit under the Robinson-Patman Act charging a primary-line
section 2(a) violation.Requiring proof of "causation "the district court set
a pragmatic test for compliance in primary-line price discrimination cases
and, on that basis, granted summary judgment to the defendant.Plaintiff
must show, said

0e

court, not only the lowered price which caused the

27. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
28. 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
29. It was significant in that case that the court read the record as precluding a
predatory territorial price reduction aimed at eliminating a competitor. Also significant
was the fact that it found the petitioning company to have exercised "restraint" i n
invoking its local pricing i n the area i n question. Id. at 842.
30. 224 F. Supp. 922 (D.N.]. 19611).
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injury but that the price was subsidized by higher prices elsewhere. Other
wise, the injury caused would have been caused only by the low price not
by the "discrimination.
"31Having said that, the rule was comparatively easy
to state,
[1]t is the general rule in territorial primary line injury cases that to establish the
necessary causative link between the price difference and the injury to competitors
and competition, it must be shown that high prices aided the injurious low prices
and enabled defendant to charge them. Conversely, if no relationship is shown
between prices in the low price area and prices in other areas, the injured party's
case fails for lack of causation
'When a seller underbids a competitor,
thereby injuring him, the injury is an "effect" of discrimination only if the low
price is supported by other prices and their prOfits, wherever charged. Otherwise,
the low price alone has caused the injury and the price discrimination is but
incidental. Thus. if it is shown that the low bid is below cost, it is fairly inferrable
that profits made on other prices financed the complained· of low price. If the
price is completely self·sufficient, it may be inferred that no relationship between
high and low pnces exists, and therefore that the discrimination had not the
proscribed "effect."32
.

•

•

•

According to the court, the seller need merely satisfy himself that his
local price is self-sufficient to determine the legality of the price under 2(a).
Indeed, it is the comparative simplicity of this test that the court finds most
appealing. Striking at the "compete-at-your-own-risk-policy" which it finds
an alternative to some reasonably predictable means of establishing the
propriety of territorial price competition, the court states that reconciliation
of Robinson-Patman with broader aims on antitrust laws requires no less
and concludes "competition, while it may take many forms, is most meaning
ful and vigorous when it consists of or includes price rivalry. vVe must read
the Act to encourage price competition wherever possible. Price uniformity
is the anti-thesis of competition."33The rationale is rather broad. The case
is a private treble damage action to begin with. The competition involved
does not partake of the kinds of activity condemned in Anheuser-Busch.
Yet following the court's reasoning, one would come to the same conclusion
for any injury which was caused by a self-sustaining price in a primary-line
case.
'Vhen price discrimination effects competition between customers of
the seller, a much stricter standard applies.34 Mere granting of a price dis
crimination in these cases is usually sufficient to establish a 2(a) violation,
since the probability of injury to the high-price buyer is in the normal
case "self evident."Even this easy characterization, however, must yield to
31. Causation, which is equally essential to a cause of action, is more subtle and
difficult to discern. Injury is not an "effect" of discrimination directly. Rather
it is the result of a low price which a discrimination in price allowed the de
fendant to charge. High prices provide for the predatory defendant the profit
margins with which to lower other prices and undercut competitors. The
existence of a difference is essential to the injury. The injury is an effect of the
discrimination.
Id. at 925.
32. Id. at 926.
33. Id. at 927.
34. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
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economic reality. In local gas price wars, discrimination may be temporary.
Can one infer from a short period of discriminatory pricing that the req
uisite anticompetitive effect has been established? Ruling on precisely
this question in American Oil Co.

v.

FTC, the Seventh Circuit held no.3:I

Instead the court held that the Trade Commission would have to demon
strate competitive injury. At least with respect to discriminations for so
short a period, Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

v.

FTC36 applied. A long-term dis

crimination between competitive customers, as in Mortou Salt37 presents,
according to the court, a probability of injury considerably different than
the one in American Oil. During the shorter period, a price differential may
or may not have caused significant injury to competition among gas stations.
The Commission is put to its proof.
Finally, the Supreme Court suggested by way of dictum in FTC

v.

Sun Oil CO.,3S a case that is discussed more fully in another context below,39
that there remains yet another entirely different area of flexibility. Sun Oil
had argued before the Supreme Court that to interdict its action in the face
of price wars and to require of it area price uniformity would have the
result of substantial price stultification. According to Sun, its dealers were
so situated that if it retained its present distributive scheme any geographic
line which was drawn for a price zone would find a dealer close enough to
his nearest competitor who was charged a different price to make out a case
of discrimination. To this assertion the Court had several replies. One of
them suggested feathered discounting "under which the amount of the price
allowance diminishes as it reaches stations further away from the center of
the price war . . . . "40 Indeed, even without feathering, the Court suggested
"in appraising the effects of any price cut or the corresponding response
to it, both the Federal Trade Commission and the courts must make realistic
appraisals of relative competitive facts. Invocation of mechanical word
formulas cannot be made to substitute for adequate probative analysis. In
cases in which the economic facts so indicate, carefully drawn area sub
markets may be the proper measure of competitive impact among pur
chasers. "41 Without certainty as to a definition of "submarket" which will
fit a price discrimination context one can, nevertheless, assert two characAmerican Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963).
289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 34.
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 u.S. 505 (1963).
See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 38 at 527 n.l7:
[1]t may be noted that a properly designed and limited price reduction system
fashioned in such a manner might, under appropriate circumstances, be found
to have obviated substantial competitive harm to the other Sun dealers and
thereby negated a violation of § 2(a) such as is here charged. Of course, im·
properly designed or too sharply drawn "feathering" gradations may produce
precisely the same effect as no gradation at all, and consequently fall within
the same ban as an outright legal discrimination.
41. Id. at 527.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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teristics of such a "submarket." It is likely to be smaller than a "market"
and it is likely to be somewhat more pragmatically structured.
The determination of the three cases seems to be that the anticompeti
tive effect of a price discrimination is not to be judged any longer by seman
tic formulas. Especially in primary-line cases, but apparently in secondary
line cases as well, pragmatic approaches based on economic realities seem
to have found new currency.
The Meeting of Competition Defense. A justification for price dis
crimination under the Act is provided by the 2(b) meeting of competition
defense.42 Since the defense successfully invoked allows the seller to justify
a discrimination in price under 2(a) (as well as a 2(d) or (e) violation) 4 3 on
the ground of self interest without taking into account the anticompetitive
effect that may be occasioned on others, the section has a controversial
history. It has never been a favorite of the Commission which has attempted
to limit the section by a strict reading and extreme interpretation. 4 4 The
courts have been more agreeable. The Trade Commission held that the
meeting of competition defense was applicable to the furnishing of services
but not to their payment; the courts disagreed. 45 And the Trade Commis
sion ultimately capitulated. 4 6
The Trade Commission has taken a very narrow position with respect
to the facts required to invoke a 2(b) defense.
'V'e think the emphasized words place two requirements on the seller who
would avail himself of this defense. First, the seller in making the defended sale
must have acted for the purpose of meeting a competitor's equally low price.
The phrase "made . . . to meet" can mean no less. . . .
Secondly, a discriminator seeking to avail himself of a section 2(b) defense
must not only have satisfied the meeting of equally low price, but that purpose
must have been conceived "in good faith." In this connection it must be noted
that section 2(b) deals not only with tangible, objective facts, but with a state of
mind as well. Thus, the mere fact that the competitor has sold to a buyer at a
particular price does not standing alone preclude a discrimination made to
"meet" it.47

In other words, in order to invoke the defense, the respondent must
successfully ascertain the identity of the competitor and the quantum of
the discount. Blundering into an appropriate discount is not enough.
Furthermore, the Commission held it is imperative that the discount be
given only to customers actually solicited by a competitor. With respect to
any customer who had not received a competitor's offer (whether or not
such offer was generally available in the area), the defense did not apply.
The Fifth Circuit has strongly suggested that it would not require such
42. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
43. Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v.
FTC, supra note 16.
44. See, e.g., Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
45. Ibid.
46. J. A. Folger & Co., No. 8094, FTC, Nov. 14, 1962.
47. Forster Mfg. Co., No. 7207, FTC, March 18, 1963.
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custom tailoring of discounts and might be prone to accept discounts made
generally available in the area although it had not specifically reached this
point.48 Professor Handler argues convincingly that the Trade Commis
sion's assertion that an offer must have been received from the discrimina
tor's competitor was impliedly rejected in Sun Oil.49
The Commission has taken the position that price cuts made to meet
competitor pricing as a means of obtaining new customers is not covered
by the 2(b) justification. Reasoning that such an interpretation would
stifle competition for new customers and force a monopoly, the Seventh
Circuit reversed.5o The Commission has declined to follow that case.1I1
An even greater division of opinion can be found on whether the price
to be met must be known to be lawful, supposed to be lawful, or just not
known to be unlawful. Until very recently the Trade Commission had
apparently taken the position through Tri-Valley Packing Ass'nll2 that
the respondent had the burden of proving facts which would lead a
reasonable person to believe that the competitor's price being met was a
lawful price. The second point of view comes from Commissioner Elman's
dissent in the same case.He would then have required nothing more than
that the seller would have had no reason to believe the prices he met to be
unlawful. The case is on appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Since that time we have at least one other point of view.Dissenting in
Continental Baking Co.,lIa Commissioner MacIntyre suggested the follow
ing:

Perhaps, in the years ahead, the Supreme Court again will be provided with an
opportunity to review this sort of problem. If it should, I feel confdent it will
reconsider its use of the term "lawful price" in the Standard Oil case and modify
its ruling so as to preclude justification of unlawful destructive price discrimina
tion on the basis of self defense against lawful conduct. If that should be done,
undoubtedly the Court will make it clear that the "good faith defense," while not
applicable to such situations of unlawful pricing as were involved in the Staley
case, is, nevertheless, available as a matter of self defense and complete justifcation
for the use of price discrimination to combat unlawful and wrongful pricing
practices of competing sellers.54
Apparently Commissioner MacIntyre, preoccupied with the law of self
defense, would change the requirement to proof of the unlawfulness of
the pricing. One can see from the mere listing of the above-mentioned
problems that the position of the Trade Commission has been to favor a
restrictive point of view.
The last-quoted case suggests that the Trade Commission's position

48. General Gas Corp. v. National Utilities of Gainesville, Inc., 271 F.2d 820 (5th
Cir. 1959). Cf. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955).
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
49. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments. 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 185 (1963).
50. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
51. Trade Reg. Rep. � 50166 (Nov. 23, 1962).
52. Trade Reg. Rep. � 15893 at 2074 (May 10, 1962).
53. Trade Reg. Rep. � 16720 (Dec. 31, 1963).
54. Id. at 21650.
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may be changing somewhat. \Vriting for the majority, Commissioner Elman,
in Contin ental Baking Co., had these words to say about section 2(b):

At the heart of Section 2(b) is the concept of "good faith." This is a flexible
and pragmatic, not technical nor doctrinaire, concept. The standard of good
faith is simply the standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what
he reasonably believes is a situation of competitive necessity. [Citations omitted.]
Such a standard, whether it be considered "subjective" or "objective," is inherently
ad hoc. Rigid rules and inflexible absolutes are especially inappropriate in dealing
with the�(D)Oefense; the facts and circumstances of the particular case, not
abstract theories nor remote conjectures, should govern its interpretation and
application. Thus, the same method of meeting competition may be consistent
with an inference of good faith in some circumstances, inconsistent with such
inference in others.55
Unfortunately the broad and reassuring language of Commissioner
Elman occurred in a model case of meeting of competition. The respondent
abstained from discriminatory pricing at considerable loss for a substantial
period. Thereafter it adopted a highly selective discount system-on an
individual basis to meet actual competitive offers. The recipients of the
allowances were questioned as to the terms of their offers, and their stories
were verified. Even under the Trade Commission's most stringent recent
'
decisions this was a good faith meeting of competition.5 6
The 2(b) defense has now also been before the United States Supreme
Court. The resulting decision, FTC

v.

Sun Oil CO.,5 7 however, leaves more

questions unanswered than answered. Sun Oil had lowered its price to a
small retailer who was engaged in a price war with a neighboring station.
The Trade Commission held good faith meeting of competition inapplica
ble. The Fifth Circuit reversed5 8 only to be reversed in tum by the United
States Supreme Court. Unfortunately for the clarity of the resulting deci
sion, it may well tum on differences in the facts perceived by the Fifth
Circuit and those perceived by the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals
had treated the neighboring "independent"as an integrated supplier-retailer
while the Supreme Court, finding nothing in the records to support that
concIu�ion, treated it as an independent retailer. The Fifth Circuit assumed
that the price war was subsidized by a competitive oil company through
the independent station while the Supreme Court could find no evidence
indicating anything but price competition based on the greater efficiency
of the independent retailer. These factual differences are, of course, more
than enough to account for the different conclusions of the courts.
The rationale of the Supreme Court in the initial portion of its opinion
does not seem to depend on this factual distinction. The Court explains,
at some length, that a rather curious reading of the statute is required in
order to interpret it as applying to a buyer'S customers rather than the

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 21647.
See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 37I U.S. 505 (1963).
Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961).
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seller's. The argument is convincingly made.5 9 One is led to wonder, how
ever, if the matter is settled by the statute, why the Court should have felt
compelled to point out that should the independent station turn out to be
an integrated supplier-retailer a different case would be presented.60 If the
case turns on interpreting the statute to allow the seller only to match
other seller's prices, the integration or lack of integration of the competitor
would not seem relevant. Nor could one explain the Court's lengthy econom
ic justification of the conclusion. Indeed, if the retailer were not the
efficient solo retailer which the Court assumes, the economic explanation
would have considerably less force.
In any event it is impossible to read the probing opinion of the Court
and believe that meeting of competition can any longer be interpreted
without recourse to an economic evaluation of the circumstances. It should
be remembered that whatever was said in the opinion about statutory
interpretation must be read in conjunction with the Court's suggestion
that "invocation of tpechanical word formulas cannot be made to substitute
for adequate probative analysis."61
As in the area of definition of anticompetitive effect, some evidence is
to be found of a greater pragmatism in approach. While it is still far from
clear what information must be available to the supplier to justify his
pricing differential, the courts have suggested, and the Trade Commission
has now said, that reasonable business judgment may suffice as a standard
of evaluation both of the existence and the lawfulness of the price. Further
more, the scope of the competitive exception may be broadened to include
aggressive price cutting and, perhaps, to allow an area response to an in
dividual competitive offer. Most speculative, and most interesting, is what
kind of competition is included in the defense. If something other than
the seller's competition is included in the "other case" which the Supreme
Court did not reach, the section is sure to have a substantially increased
effect.
Buyer Cooperatives. In an industry in which distribution is complex
and distributive integration is extant in varying degrees several special
problems with functional pricing must be faced.
In the more traditionally organized industry, one would expect a
seller normally to have several prices, functionally distinguished from each
59. 371 U.s. at 514:
Reading the words to have "their normal and customary meaning." . . . the
§ 2(b) phrase "equally low price of a competitor" would seem to refer to the
price of a competitor of the seller who grants, and not of the buyer who receives.
Were something more intended by Congress.
the discriminatory price cut
we would have expected a more explicit recitation as. for example, is the case
in § 2(a) in which the intent to give broader scope was expressly effected by the
prohibition of price discriminations which, inter alia, adversely affected compe
tition not only with the seller ... who grants the favored price, but with the
. . and "with customers of either of them."
knowing recipient thereof
60. Id. at 512.
61. Id. at 527.
.

.

.

•

•
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other. Thus one would expect that a wholesaler would receive a lower
price than a retailer and indeed, were this not so, wholesalers would
have greater difficulty. The same thing is true for most middlemen and it
is normally not objectionable for the seller to distinguish pricing among
the various levels of distribution on a functional scheme. In the complex
industry, however, an additional problem arises. How does one identify
the person entitled to a functionally separate price? W"ill the label of the
customer or the function he performs govern? There once was unanimity
on the correctness of the latter alternative.
The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws°::! stated:
To relate discounts or prices solely to the purchaser's resale activities without
recognition of his buying functions thwarts competition and efficiency in marketing.
It compels affirmative discrimination against a substantial class of distributors and
hence sen'es as a penalty on integration. If a businessman actually fulfills the
wholesale function by relieving his supplier of risk, transportation, administra
tion, etc., his performance, his capital investment and the saving to his sup
pliers, are unaffected by whether he also performs a retailing function, or any
number of other functions. A legal rule disqualifying him from discount
recognizing wholesale functions actually performed compels him to render these
functions free of charge. The value of the sen'ices is pocketed by the seller who
did not cam it. Such a rule proclaims as a matter of law that the integrated
wholesaler-retailer cannot possibly perform the wholesaling function; it forbids
the matter to be put to proof.

The Federal Trade Commission once agreed. In Doubleday and CO.63 the
Commission held:
In our view, to relate functional discounts solely to the purchaser's method
of resale without recognition of his buying function thwarts competition and
efficiency in marketing, and inevitably leads to higher consumer prices. It is
possible, for e.xample, for a seller to shift to customers a number of distributional
functions which the seller himself ordinarily performs. Such functions should, in
our opinion, be recognized and reimbursed. Where a businessman performs
various wholesale functions, such as providing storage, traveling salesmen and
distribution of catalogues, the law should not forbid his supplier from compensat
ing him for such services.
On the other hand, the Commission should
tolerate no subterfuge. Only to the extent that a buyer actually performs certain
functions. assuming all the risks and costs involved, should he qualify for a
compensating discount. The amount of the discount should be reasonably re
lated to the expenses assumed by the buyer. It should not exceed the cost of
that part of the function he actually performs on that part of the goods for
which he performs it.
.

.

•

The Commission's statement was a good one. '''hile in the last para
graph the standard of functional discounts was held necessarily limited to
a payment reasonably related to the services rendered, it should be noted
that there was no requirement that functional discounts be cost justified;
cost justification, or at worst cost justification coupled with proportional
equality,tH would suffice to justify a price discrimination without the need
for a theory of functional discounts.
62. 1955, p. 207.
63. 52 FTC 169, 209 (1955).
64. Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
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The harmony was ended, however, by the Trade Commission's aban

donment of its earlier position. The result left some aspects of functional
discounting to be hammered out by the court.
In a number of industries buyers have formed cooperative purchasing
groups of one sort or another. Some of these have been found paper thin.
For example, in Mid-South Distributors v. FTC65 the group, which had been
able to get substantially reduced prices for its members, existed in the
form of two cooperatives. The cooperatives had obtained aggregate volume
discounts by lumping the purchases of all members as though they came
from one customer. The cooperative seemed to the court to perform no
substantial service other than placing the orders. It would be difficult under
such circumstances to find a function (other than brokerage) for which a
discriminatory price might be allowed. Neither the Trade Commission nor
the court did. As a matter of fact an independent reason for striking price
discrimination to these buyers existed in the form of the 2(c) anti-brokerage
discrimination provision.
What of more sophisticated arrangements? If the buyers' organization,
in addition to mere placing of orders, utilizes warehousing facilities in the
distributive process would that change the Mid-South result? In the Alham
bra Motor Parts66 case the Trade Commission was inclined to believe that
it did not, or, at least, not much. The court disagreed, 67 finding that the
Commission was required to consider cost justification of the price differen
tial.If cost justification was available, since the justification here would be
based on warehousing facilities, the additional question of the availability
of similar discounts on proportionally equal terms to independent jobbers
might be raised, said the court, although it appeared to be uncertain as to
whether this would be required.6s Even more intriguingly, the court sug
gested that a sufficiently sophisticated arrangement might convert the
jointly-owned buying group from the status of an intermediary whose dis
counts are to be judged by the effect on the jobber-owner's competitors to
an independent buyer entitled to a functional discount to be judged by the
effect on others on its functional line (in this case warehouse distributors).
Since the trial examiner in Alhambra has held that the jobber members
were the buyers rather than their jointly-owned buying group, the court
did not expand on this point.
On the other hand, in a case dealing not with a joint-buying group
but merely with functional discounts, the Trade Commission made it clear
that its view on that subject was now a harsh one indeed. In Mueller CO.OII

65. 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961).
66. No. 6889 FTC, 1960.
67. Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, supra note 64, at 215.
68. See Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 377·381 (1962)
(finding 2(d) inapplicable to such cases).
69. No. 7514, FTC, Jan. 22, 1962.
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it held discriminatory a ten per cent additional discount given to "stocking "
jobbers over regular jobbers on the basis of warehousing provided by the
"stocking "jobber. "While there was a finding that the extra ten per cent was
sometimes received on items for which warehousing was not required, the
brunt of the opinion rested on the fact that the discount was not cost justi
fied and also that it was not entirely available on a proportionally equal
basis. As previously mentioned, the dual requirements imposed, negate
giving the buyer the benefit of functional status. He is treated as all other
purchasers who do not perform the function save only for an amount which
can be "cost justified "and made available proportionally to his competi
tors, grounds which would justify non-functional discriminations of all
sorts save brokerage discounts.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in Mueller Go.

v.

FTG.7o Judge Swygert

in a vigorous dissent succinctly characterized the holding:

According to the Commission's present view, legal recognition cannot be
given to the fact that a customer integrates a warehousing function with his
selling function and is compensated for so doing by lower purchase price. The
Commission maintains that only the selling characteristics of the customer, i.e.,
whether wholesaler or retailer, should be considered when setting prices.
He disagrees, adding "labels should yield to realities."7 1
As for the other half of the suggestion in Alhambra, namely that an
independent buying group, wholly owned by buyers on a lower level of
distribution, might successfully obtain a functional discount commensu
rate with the discount of those competing on the higher distributive level,
the Commission recently made it clear that it did not consider it possible.
In National Parts Warehouse72 the Commission held illegal the receipt of
a price reduction by a limited partnership created by individual automotive
part jobbers. It was apparently not disputed that, with respect to the bulk of
purchases made, the partnership performed a substantial warehousing func
tion. Claiming to have breathed life into their creation, the jobbers insisted
on its independent right to obtain a functional discount. The Commission's
answer was comparatively terse. A controlled purchaser may not ge( a
functional discount which could not be justified for the controlling group.
Control was a simple matter of income How. Since the income of the partner
ship went to the jobber, control, according to Chairman Dixon, was estab
lished. Commissioner Elman filed a vigorous dissent pointing out that the
Commission's decision essentially prevented independent jobbers from
achieving a measure of functional integration even in a case such as the
instant one where such integration would be possible without anticompeti
tive results.
Another line of cases had a close relationship to these functional dis-

70. 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963).
71. Id. at 48-49.
72. No. 8039, FTC, June 12, 1962.
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count cases: the cases dealing with the payments made in lieu of brokerage
under Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.73 Since 2(c) prohibits dis
criminatory payment for or in lieu of brokerage almost absolutely,H to the
extent that a joint buying group attempts to obtain from suppliers a price
discrimination for the performance of brokerage services such an attempt
must fail.75 In any case in which suppliers use brokers for sales to some
customers but not to others and a discount is given to some direct-buying
customers, two questions arise. First, was there any allowance "in lieu of
brokerage" in the sales in which brokers were not used? And secondly, if
so, how much? The Supreme Court spoke to the second problem in FTC

v.

Henry Brach & CO.76 In that case an independent broker lowered his
"usual" commission of five per cent to three per cent in order to affect a
transaction. The two per cent saving was passed along as part of the re
duction to the purchaser. The Supreme Court using the five pe� cent usually
charged as the measure of the value of the brokerage service found a viola
tion of 2(c) with respect to the reduced two per cent. It specifically rejected
an argument that the two per cent was merely a 2(a) discrimination which
was passed on to the buyer as part of the seller's cost saving since, after all,
the seller had had its brokerage fee reduced by two per cent. In this respect
the Supreme Court was quite clear that 2(a) and 2(c) were to be isolated in
application.
To the Trade Commission the meaning of the case was clear. The
price of brokerage was the high price paid for it. A reduction from that scale
was a reduction in lieu of brokerage. The implication of that interpretation
for a group having a measure of functional integration is equally clear.
Their brokerage costs and the brokerage costs to non-integrated buyers
should be identical. Not so, said the court in Thomasville Chair Co.

v.

FTC.77
We recognize that the Supreme Court has dearly and definitely held that
even though the language of Section 2(a) may be broad enough to warrant the
precise reduction in price that was put into effect by Broch and Company in the
case then before the Supreme Court, the prohibitions of Section 2(c) are to be
read independently and thus to that extent modify the broad proviso of Section
2(a). However, as we read it, the Court's opinion says that a reduction in price,
giving effect to reduced commissions paid by the seHer, are a violation of Section
2(c) only if such reduction in price is "discriminatory." We read that to mean
"without justification based on actual bona fide difference in the costs of sales
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are sold or delivered."78

On this basis the Court concluded that the Trade Commission could
not prohibit a dual sales commission scheme in which some customers
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958).
See generally FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
American Motors Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960).
Supra note 74.
306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 545.
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were serviced on a three per cent sales commission and charged accordingly
while others paid a price based on the seller's payment of a six per cent
sales commission on sales to them. Before the discount to the former group
could be declared illegal, the Court held, the Commission would have to
permit a full scale inquiry into the extent of cost savings inherent in sales
men's handling of the favored customers and the consequent propriety
of the lower sales commissions.
The other problem may be more difficult. The fact of a price reduction
is not determinative of the passing on of brokerage favors. The Supreme
Court in the Broch case specifically approved the Trade Commission's
holding in Main Fish Co., Inc.79 in which the Commission explained at
length how difficult it was to extrapolate from the differing prices for fish
whether a given price included a payment in lieu of brokerage. Obviously
something more than a reduction in price need be shown. Indeed, even a
reduction called a reduction in brokerage may turn out to be another
type of functional discount on closer analysis.so Once a reasonable inference
of brokerage is established, the Commission may shift the burden of prov
ing that a discount was given for some reason other than brokerage to the
grantor.81 At what point may such inference be drawn?
Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. was another wholly-owned buying
cooperative. It "bought" food products on which it applied its private label,
the food being shipped directly from supplier to retailer but being billed
to and paid by C.R.O.G. On purchases of its private brand merchandise no
brokerage commission was paid although suppliers usually paid brokerage
on their packer label products. Finding a rough mathematical correlation
between discounts received by Central and the brokerage usually charged
by the supplier, the Trade Commission held that it had established a 2(c)
viola lion. Denying that the inference could be so readily established, the
Seventh Circuit said,
The inference upon which the Commission's finding and order are based has
no substantial evidence in the record to support it. Instead, the record con
" incingly shows that the payments made by Central to its suppliers were for
merchandise which it bought upon its own credit and not on orders of its mem
bers transmitted by it to the suppliers. The fact that Central, because of its
strong purchasing power, was able to buy at favorable prices, or on discounts
and allowances by its suppliers, is not proof that Central was rendering a broker
age service. It bought on its own order and on its own credit. It was billed by the
suppliers and it paid the bills. A broker does not purchase for his own account,
is not billed by the seller, and does not make payments to the seller. Central
was able to secure favorable prices from its suppliers, because of (1) their assured
volume of business, (2) their lack of any credit risk, (3) a reduction in their billing
work, and (4) Central's advance commitments for later requirements.S2

Lest the court be misinterpreted, the breadth of its holding was
79.
80.
81.
82.

53 FTC 88 (1956).
Edward J. Hruby, No. 8068, FTC, Dec. 26, 1962.
FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 282 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1960).
Central Retailer·Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1963).

HeinOnline -- 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 503 1963-1964

".

504

SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW

quickly explained. "Reason does not permit our ignoring these facts in
order to declare illegal a worthy effort by a number of wholesale grocers,
owned by retailers, to reduce the ultimate sale prices to the consumer, by
entering into the arrangement with Central, which made them stronger in
their competition with large chain stores."S3 The opinion went on to quote
a speech reputedly made by FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon in which he
pointed to retailer-o¥''lled cooperative food wholesalers as the only answer
to the extermination of small independent grocery stores. Since these inde
pendents were the prime intended beneficiaries of the Robinson-Patman
Act, it is not surprising to find the court solicitous.
One thing is clear. Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. underlined
the requirement that the Trade Commission establish the passage of the
allowances in lieu of brokerage by something other than a bare reduction
in retailer price. What is not so clear is how much more the case holds .
By its strong emphasis on purchases made by C.R.O.C. for its own account,
rather than as broker for its members, the court seems to be according
jointly-owned buying groups a new functional status. Which of the activi
ties of the cooperative are sufficiently unrelated to the "commission, broker
age, or other compensation," which the act prohibits being compensated by
discriminatory reductions in price, is not clear. Even less clear is the appar
ent assertion that none of the discount given for the services rendered by
the cooperative were discounts in lieu of brokerage.s4 If the brokerage
allowance problem can be avoided by groups functioning as the one in the
instant case, buyer's cooperatives have great potential for competition with
integrated firms. The benefits of such a rule, however, also seem to run to
the larger firms with whom the cooperative's members compete. They ought
also on such analysis to be able to create wholly-owned buying companies
capable of avoiding at least the per se interdiction of allowances in lieu of
brokerage.
A wide gulf separates recent court suggestions of buyer group autonomy
from the Trade Commission's present position equating such groups and
their owners. Between the two, the possibility of distinguishing on the basis
of the competitive effect of functional integration seems to be frequently
overlooked. To be sure, little would be added by viewing anticompetitive
effect solely in terms of the impact on non-integrated buyers; on the
Morton Salt analysis, they might well be injured.S:; Since the identical
language has been interpreted, in primary-line discrimination cases, to
require a more rigorous examination of the effect on competition than a
mere effect on one competitor would disclose,s6 a broad inquiry into com
petitive injury might help decide cases.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 415.
"There were no savings in brokerage expenses involved in this case . . . . " Ibid.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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For the buying cooperative, then, the prediction of greater flexibility in
the future must be hedged more than the comparable prediction with respect
to seller flexibility in general pricing. It will depend in part on the persua
siveness of the Thomasville Chair and Central Retailer-Owned Grocer cases
in other courts. At least, the cases do represent a wedge in the Trade Com
mission decision to ignore the existence of the groups entirely for purposes
of analysing pricing differences.
Conclusion. It is difficult to say what recent cases, such as the ones
reviewed, have done to the Robinson-Patman Act. It is easier to say what
they have not done. They have clearly not erased the main thrust of pre
vious decisions which have been accused by so many as having created a
state of soft competition. One does find more reference in the opinions,
however, to such things as economic realities concerning the litigants in
volved and less reliance placed on conclusions reached solely by strict
interpretation of the unfelicitous language of the statue. In a statute that is
as complex in structure and awkward in form as the Robinson-Patman Act,
that alone accomplishes a good deal. Even the Trade Commission is now
on record in one decision suggesting that the meeting of competition de
fense is to be viewed essentially pragmatically. To think that this process,
even if it continues, will ultimately lead to a statute wholly consistent with
the interpretation of the Sherman Act is to hope too much. Professor
Handler may be right when he says "The time is long overdue for a com
prehensive legislative revision of the Robinson-Patman Act."81
Neither does it seem likely that the Federal Trade Commission will
in the future be able to use its Section 5 Federal Trade Commission Act
power broadly to strike dovm whatever practices it conceives ill-founded
in the light of the spirit of Robinson-Patman nor that defense lawyers rely
ing on the rule of reason will carry the day. As the Supreme Court said in
FTC

v.

Sun Oil Co., in which it warned against "invocation of mechanical

word formulas"88 to solve Robinson-Patman problems, "We are not inter
preting a broadly phrased constitutional provision, but rather a narrowly
worded statutory enactment with specific prohibitions and specific excep·
tions."89 The two thoughts taken together may well describe the present
approach to Robinson-Patman interpretation.
87. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 187 (1963).
88. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 528 (1963).
89. Ibid.
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